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Low Costs Of Defensive Medicine,
Small Savings From Tort Reform

In this paper we present the costs of defensive medicine in
thirty-five clinical specialties to determine whether malpractice liability
reforms would greatly reduce health care costs. Defensive medicine
includes tests and procedures ordered by physicians principally to reduce
perceived threats of medical malpractice liability. The practice is
commonly assumed to increase health care costs. The results of studies of
the costs of defensive medicine have been inconsistent. We found that
estimated savings resulting from a 10 percent decline in medical
malpractice premiums would be less than 1 percent of total medical care
costs in every specialty. These savings are lower than most previous
estimates, and they suggest that the presumed impact of tort reform on
health care costs may be overstated.
ABSTRACT

B

ecause medical malpractice insurance premiums account for less
than 2 percent of total estimated
national health spending,1 some
observers assert that tort reform
would do little to help control rising health
care costs. However, others point out that physicians’ efforts to avoid malpractice litigation—by
ordering marginally useful tests, performing
marginally useful procedures, and prescribing
marginally useful medications—can add billions
of dollars to our national health care bill.

Background On Defensive Medicine
Defensive medicine is generally agreed to exist,
but the extent and the costs involved have been
the subject of much debate. A distinction is
sometimes made between “positive” defensive
medicine—extra tests or procedures performed
primarily to reduce malpractice liability—and
“negative” defensive medicine, by which physicians avoid treating high-risk patients, performing high-risk procedures, or practicing in certain
geographic areas because of fear of potential
malpractice litigation.2–4 In this paper our focus
1578
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is on positive defensive medicine.
Direct surveys of physicians during the past
thirty years have yielded estimates ranging from
21 percent to 98 percent of responding physicians admitting to defensive medicine practices.3,5–7 The wide range of estimates is due to
several factors, including differences among specialties and variations in survey question wording. However, findings from empirical studies
using data sources, such as Medicare payments
or health claims, that describe costs and services
that were actually used in patient care suggest
that defensive medicine behavior may be less
prevalent than reported in direct surveys of
physicians.
Fear Of Litigation Some studies have reported strong relationships between physicians’
fear of malpractice litigation and behavior that
may reduce litigation risks, such as the use of
caesarean section instead of vaginal birth.8–13
Other studies have found such relationships to
be complex, weak, or nonexistent.14–17
Effects On Health Care Costs Studies that
examine the effects of defensive medicine on
health care costs have produced similarly conflicting findings. Several studies have found
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lower health care costs in states that have
enacted direct reforms, such as limits on awards
for noneconomic damages, compared to states
that have no such reforms.18–20 Other studies
have found weak relationships, or no relationships at all, between either malpractice premiums and health care costs or direct reforms and
health care costs.16,17,21,22
Nearly all of the studies cited above focused on
limited sets of clinical conditions or clinical specialties, or both. However, a few recent studies
have used data supporting more comprehensive
estimates of defensive medicine costs, and these
suggest that reforms aimed at limiting damage
awards are likely to lead to only modest cost
savings.20–23
Based on these more recent studies, the
Congressional Budget Office now estimates that
decreased use of health care services associated
with specific tort reforms could reduce national
medical spending by 0.3 percent.24 A more detailed review of the research cited above is available in the online Technical Appendix.25
In the study reported here, we used a recently
developed analytic methodology—called episode
definition—and a national health care claims database that together enabled us to develop a more
precise estimate of defensive medicine costs than
previously available. Further, we developed separate estimates for all clinical conditions and
across a wide range of physician specialties.

Study Data And Methods
Our analytic approach was similar to that of several previously reported empirical studies of defensive medicine9,10,16,17,22 in that we quantified
relationships between a “tort signal,” used as a
measure of physicians’ perceived liability risk,
and medical care costs. With those relationships
specified, we determined how costs would
change in response to developments such as tort
law reforms that might affect physicians’ perceptions of malpractice liability risks.
We drew on two primary sources of data for the
study. We measured health care costs using a
database of more than 400 million paid medical
and pharmaceutical claims from CIGNA HealthCare for the two-year period July 1, 2004,
through June 30, 2006. As the tort signal, we
used data on physicians’ medical malpractice
insurance premiums.
We first describe the construction of our health
care cost and medical malpractice insurance premium variables. Next, we indicate how costs
were attributed to individual physicians and
how the physicians’ medical malpractice insurance premiums were determined. Finally, we describe the analytic approach with which

relationships between costs and insurance premiums were specified.
Costs And Premiums Claims from the CIGNA
database were grouped into episodes of care using Ingenix’s Episode Treatment Group (ETG)
software, Version 6.0.26 If, for example, claims
show a member as having a diagnosis of acute
sinusitis, the software would link the claim for
the physician office visit at which the symptoms
were diagnosed and any related claims such as
laboratory tests, imaging, or prescribed medications.
Costs on individual claims were standardized
to remove variability related to provider pricing.
Methods used for cost standardization are described in the Technical Appendix.25 Episode total costs in our calculations reflect these
standardizations. Differences in costs between
groups of episodes indicate differences in quantity and mix of services and resources used, not
price differences. Because inpatient claims are
inclusive of all services provided during inpatient stays, it was not possible with these claims
data to distinguish care management differences
such as the use of intensive care units.
Physicians’ medical malpractice premiums
were determined using data from state insurance
department rate filings submitted by insurers.
Medical malpractice, like all other forms of insurance, is regulated in every state by the department of insurance. Insurer rate filings are
considered public data in all states, accessible
through open records or freedom-of-information requests. We obtained medical malpractice
rate filings from companies with large market
share in thirty states, where more than 70 percent
of CIGNA members live.
Medical malpractice premiums differ by clinical risk category, which is a function of specialty
and surgery and obstetrics procedures performed; the amount of insurance coverage being
purchased; and the number of years of risk
exposure being insured. First-year physicians always have the lowest premiums, and physicians
who have been with a company for five or more
years, called mature physicians, always have the
highest premium rate.
We standardized the tort signal that might be
associated with different levels of malpractice
insurance coverage across physicians by using
premiums for mature physicians with policies
that insurers describe as “$1 million/$3 million
coverage,” meaning that physicians are insured
up to $1 million for each separate incident and a
total of $3 million per year. This allowed us to
eliminate variability in the tort signal.
Using data on insurer market share from the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, we calculated the average medical malS ep t e m b e r 20 1 0
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practice premium. The premium calculation was
weighted in terms of insurer market share by
calendar quarter for each of 61 physician risk
categories—known as Insurance Service Organization, or ISO, classes—and each of 108 malpractice insurance territories comprising
3,143 counties in 30 states. A state-level summary of medical malpractice premium data is
given in Technical Appendix Table 1.25
Attributing Costs To Physicians Responsibility for the costs of individual episodes was
assigned to physicians on the basis of the physicians’ professional costs. An episode was attributed to a physician if the physician accounted for
the largest percentage, and at least 30 percent, of
the episode’s included professional costs. This is
the episode attribution rule used by many health
plans for provider economic profiling.
Determining Premium Rates For medical
malpractice insurance, some clinical specialties—such as general surgery—fall into a single
risk category. For example, ISO 80143 is for general surgery. Many specialties, however, are divided by insurers into multiple categories,
usually on the basis of amount and kinds of surgery performed. For example, gynecologists are
partitioned into three risk groups—ISO 80244
for no surgery; ISO 80277 for minor surgery; and
ISO 80167 for major surgery.
Although rate filings are considered public information in all states, methods used by insurers
to determine physicians’ risk-category assignments are not available to the public and are
treated as proprietary by insurers. However,
we were able to define standard risk-category
assignment procedures using practice specialty
and certification designations available in
CIGNA’s provider file, and physicians’ billed service codes available in our claims database.
To reduce the chance of surgical physicians
being misclassified as nonsurgical, we used a
statistical procedure—based on the Poisson distribution—for each major and minor surgery ISO
to identify the minimum number of claims necessary to assure, with 95 percent confidence, that
a physician having no major or minor surgery
claims was assigned the correct risk category.
Specific qualification criteria were developed
for sixty-one physician risk categories. Criteria
for cardiologists and cardiac surgeons are shown
in Technical Appendix Exhibit 1.25
Modeling Costs Of Defensive Medicine We
constructed separate analytic files for each of the
approximately 22,000 combinations of clinical
conditions and insurance risk groups. Each of
these files contained one record per physician
and included the natural log of the physician’s
average episode costs as the dependent variable
in our analyses. Each file also included average
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medical malpractice insurance premiums—since
premiums could differ by calendar quarter—as
the principal independent variable.
CIGNA’s member and provider files contributed data for additional independent variables,
used as control variables in our analyses. From
the provider file, controls included physicians’
state and specialty certification status. With data
from the member file, average patient age, sex,
and health status27 were calculated for each
physician. If a patient had multiple episodes with
the same physician, one of the episodes was selected randomly so that observations included in
averages would be independent.
One other control variable, included as a measure of physician competition, was the number
of physicians in the relevant specialty per
100,000 people in the physician’s county or Metropolitan Statistical Area, which we obtained
from the Area Resource File, Health Resources
and Services Administration. Finally, each record included the number of patients managed
in that condition by the physician.
With these data, we structured two-level hierarchical models, with the physician as level 1 and
the geographic area as level 2. Hierarchical regression accounts for differences in dependent
variable variance that may occur because of clustering of cases—such as multiple patients managed by a single physician, or multiple
physicians practicing in a single geographic
area. Average medical malpractice insurance
premium; physicians’ certification status; number of physicians per 100,000 population; and
patients’ average age, sex, and health status
served as fixed effects. Physicians’ state of residence was used as a random effect, and the number of patients as the weighting factor.
Limitations Our methodology has several limitations. Although our database for calculating
market share–weighted average malpractice premiums is as comprehensive as any previously
used in defensive medicine studies, it does not
include data for self-insured physician populations, such as large hospital systems. Furthermore, our malpractice premium rates are area
averages, and not individual physicians’ malpractice premium values.
Physicians’ ISO assignments were based on
procedures devised by our research team, not
by the malpractice insurers themselves. One insurer was willing to share with us its rules for
assigning risk categories to physicians, and we
found that percentages of physicians assigned to
the different categories by our procedures were
similar to the percentages for that insurer’s assignments. However, we recognize that our procedures might well differ from those of some,
perhaps many, of the other companies.
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Study Results
Our CIGNA claims are grouped into thirty-five
million completed episodes—that is, those with
identifiable starting and ending dates. Of these,
23 million were attributed to physicians in the 30
states for which we have medical malpractice
insurance premium data, and physicians in
our 61 defined insurance risk groups accounted
for 22.7 million of these. Limiting our analyses to
physicians for whom we were 95 percent confident of correct insurance risk category assignment and to clinical conditions that included
sufficient numbers of physicians for regression
analysis further reduced the number of episodes
to a final count of 15.4 million.
Exhibit 1 shows the results of our ISO assign-

ment process. In seventeen specialties, physicians were assigned to a single ISO category.
Twelve other specialties were partitioned into
two ISOs each. Four specialties included three
ISOs each, and two specialties each included
four ISOs.
We found that increases in episode costs were
significantly related to increases in medical malpractice premiums in 449 of our ISO- and condition-specific analyses. As shown in the righthand column of Exhibit 1, significant relationships were found in all but six clinical specialties;
and in all but nine specialties, significant relationships were found in multiple types of cases.
Specialty-specific results are summarized in
Exhibit 2. Results are shown by insurance risk

EXHIBIT 1

Number Of Case Types Suggesting Defensive Medicine, By Physician Specialty

Specialty
Allergy and immunology
Cardiology, interventional
Cardiovascular disease
Dermatology
Emergency medicine
Endocrinology
Family/general practice
Gastroenterology
Geriatric medicine
Gynecology

No. of ISO
codes
1
1
1
2
2
2
4
3
3
3

Total no. of
physicians
3,174
7,882
9,662
9,739
14,493
5,472
86,894
4,680
5,613
1,595

No. of 95% confident
physicians
3,174
7,882
9,662
8,854
2,973
3,312
16,124
943
3,057
1,039

No. of conditions with
significant results
suggesting defensive medicine
4
2
3
5
7
0
15
0
10
4

Infectious disease
Internal medicine
Nephrology
Neurology
Nuclear medicine

2
2
2
2
1

5,172
113,420
7,374
12,344
1,205

1,090
92,372
3,580
10,674
1,205

6
16
3
7
0

Obstetrics/gynecology
Occupational medicine
Oncology/hematology
Ophthalmology
Otolaryngology, ENT
Pediatrics
Psychiatry
Pulmonary disease
Rheumatology
Surgery, cardiovascular
Surgery, colon and rectal
Surgery, general
Surgery, hand
Surgery, head and neck
Surgery, neurological

1
1
2
2
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

32,219
412
12,890
18,385
9,515
53,534
16,978
8,150
3,179
8,939
1,771
28,045
2,076
1,326
4,104

32,219
412
7,470
16,212
1,940
13,227
4,656
8,150
3,179
8,939
1,771
28,045
2,076
1,326
4,104

15
0
14
1
2
13
3
3
4
1
0
10
3
5
3

Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Urology

2
1
1
1
3

22,680
5,517
4,406
5,683
9,812

6,411
5,517
4,406
5,683
6,950

6
4
0
1
4

61

538,340

328,634

Total

orthopedic
plastic
thoracic
vascular

SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES Insurance Service Organization (ISO) codes denote insurance risk categories. ENT is ear, nose, and throat.
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EXHIBIT 2

Reduction In Defensive Medicine Costs Resulting From A 10 Percent Decrease In Medical Malpractice Premiums, By Physician Specialty

Specialty

Total costs ($)

Allergy and immunology
Cardiology, interventional
Cardiovascular disease
Dermatology
Emergency medicine

% with significant
cost-to-premium
relationship

Total no. of episodes

% of all episodes in
specialty with significant
cost-to-premium relationship

Savings from
10% premium
decrease

49,829,331
120,761,026
46,648,523
247,381,261
329,848,528

1.5
0.8
0.7
1.8
0.7

90,120
38,128
33,484
1,102,908
324,056

58.6
5.4
0.1
50.7
1.4

350,530
92,944
11,232
744,438
81,843

Endocrinology
Family/general practice
Gastroenterology
Geriatric medicine
Gynecology
Infectious disease
Internal medicine
Nephrology
Neurology
Nuclear medicine

52,947,555
823,313,559
9,983,307
16,211,685
26,827,949
8,923,462
2,362,212,159
25,720,445
258,105,183
2,491,361

0.0
3.5
0.0
2.1
1.1
1.4
5.6
0.6
1.3
0.0

44,692
3,449,928
8,479
54,541
33,553
12,999
3,783,663
7,512
199,898
933

0.0
37.1
0.0
6.2
6.9
30.5
34.8
4.0
1.9
0.0

–
1,579,722
–
29,026
30,795
23,860
3,822,661
11,110
97,313
–

Obstetrics/gynecology
Occupational medicine
Oncology/hematology
Ophthalmology
Otolaryngology, ENT

1,657,148,490
1,419,937
817,727,501
210,479,279
69,396,082

6.3
0.0
3.4
1.9
0.2

1,952,058
4,540
109,414
510,422
89,220

11.0
0.0
14.3
19.5
15.0

776,800
–
554,850
332,048
32,553

Pediatrics
Psychiatry
Pulmonary disease
Rheumatology
Surgery, cardiovascular

454,098,797
49,968,587
47,614,105
30,893,935
16,889,114

6.6
0.7
1.0
1.1
0.6

2,157,286
33,597
31,859
20,566
3,399

81.4
5.1
6.6
8.1
15.9

1,588,652
170,825
49,160
65,463
20,521

15,668,727
1,018,380,585
36,918,689
63,074,942
240,127,600
545,807,420
112,299,110
44,394,508
10,475,730
388,889,451
10,212,877,924

0.0
2.9
1.4
4.0
0.8
1.3
1.5
0.0
0.3
0.5
2.0

11,128
428,007
26,766
75,290
37,739
313,122
80,382
4,242
4,344
278,369
15,356,644

0.0
20.8
3.0
20.2
18.6
5.4
32.4
0.0
0.5
4.2
35.8

–
782,486
33,207
221,384
804,769
557,695
440,932
–
27,940
151,242
13,486,001

Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Surgery,
Urology
Total

colon and rectal
general
hand
head and neck
neurological
orthopedic
plastic
thoracic
vascular

SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES This exhibit has been abridged because of space constraints. The complete exhibit is available online by clicking on the Technical
Appendix link in the box to the right of the article online. ENT is ear, nose, and throat.

group in Technical Appendix Tables 3 and 4.25
For example, for allergy and immunology, the
relationship between episode costs and medical
malpractice insurance premiums was positive
and significant in only 1.5 percent of episodes
analyzed. However, these clinical conditions accounted for 58.6 percent of all episodes managed
by physicians in that specialty.
Based on our results for these physicians, we
calculated that a 10 percent reduction in medical
malpractice insurance premiums would lead to a
savings of $350,530 across all episodes managed
by allergy and immunology specialists.28 (For
additional results, see Appendix Exhibit 3 in
the online Technical Appendix.)25 On a per epi1582
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sode basis, the estimated savings are small, and
this figure represents only 0.703 percent of
medical care costs for these physicians.
Across all specialties, reductions in medical
malpractice premiums would lead to statistically
significant savings in 2.0 percent of the conditions analyzed, but these are high-volume situations, comprising 35.8 percent of all episodes.
However, the magnitude of savings that could be
realized is small, accounting for less than 1 percent of medical care costs in every specialty.
Across all thirty-five specialties, savings associated with a 10 percent premium reduction in
medical malpractice premiums would be just
0.132 percent. Even if medical malpractice pre-
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Defensive medicine
practices exist and are
widespread, but their
impact on medical
care costs is small.

miums were to be reduced as much as 30 percent,
defensive medicine costs would decline no more
than 0.4 percent.
Recognizing that our findings could be sensitive to procedures used for assigning ISO codes—
specifically, our methods for qualifying 95 percent confident ISO assignments—we repeated
our analyses using all physicians in the database,
not just those for whom we were 95 percent confident of ISO qualification. Results of these
analyses were quite similar to those presented
in Exhibit 2, with total savings from a 10 percent
premium reduction accounting for 0.120 percent
of total medical care costs.
Because our results also could be overly influenced by small numbers of physicians in some
analyses, we reestimated our cost calculations,
using results from only those analyses that included at least fifty-five physicians; total estimated cost savings were 0.134 percent of
medical care costs.
To evaluate the validity of our cost estimate, we
“drilled down” into the episodes included in the
449 risk and category combinations identified as
significant, looking for evidence of defensive
medicine practices. In 69 percent of the analyses,
we found one or more cost components—such as
evaluation and management costs or imaging

costs—with significant positive relationships to
medical malpractice premiums. Although these
analyses do not validate all of the relationships
used in our cost calculation, they provide support for most, and they reinforce our findings of
the existence of defensive medicine practices
and their limited impact on medical care costs.

Conclusion
From our analyses, we conclude that defensive
medicine practices exist and are widespread, but
their impact on medical care costs is small. This
conclusion is similar to those of other recent
studies,18,21,23 and to that of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO).24
There is a caution that applies to our cost estimate, as well as those of all empirical analyses
of defensive medicine, including the CBO study
referred to above.24 Empirical analyses such as
ours attempt to quantify relationships between
differences in physicians’ perceived liability risk
and associated behavior—in our case, behavior
that influences health care costs. If some level of
defensive behavior is shared by all or most physicians and is independent of variations in perceived risk, it will not be detected in studies
such as this. However, we believe that such
behavior would not be influenced by changes
to the medical liability environment, and that
the costs associated with such behavior are
unlikely to be affected by tort system reforms,
regardless of the level of reduction in medical
malpractice insurance premiums.
Does our analysis suggest that tort reforms
such as caps on damages and limits on attorneys’
fees should not be enacted? No, because even
this small level of extra cost should be eliminated
from the system. It does suggest, though, that
claims of high levels of expected savings from
tort reform are overstated.29 ▪
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